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Abstract: The use of social networking has exploded, with millions of people 
using various web- and mobile-based services around the world. This increase 
in social networking use has led to user anxiety related to privacy and  
the unauthorised exposure of personal information. Large-scale sharing in 
virtual spaces means that researchers, designers and developers now need to  
re-consider the issues and challenges of maintaining privacy when using social 
networking services. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of the 
current state-of-the-art privacy in social networks for both desktop and mobile 
uses and devices from various architectural vantage points. The survey will 
assist researchers and analysts in academia and industry to move towards 
mitigating many of the privacy issues in social networks. 
Keywords: social networks; privacy; access control; distributed social 
networks; mobile social networks; open source social networks; Privacy by 
Design; PbD. 
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A social network (SN) is a website or network of connections and relationships. In 
general, it is defined as “a network of interactions of relationships” (Aggarwal, 2011), 
while its most classic definition is “the interactions of humans” (Aggarwal, 2011) in a 
platform. Some of the most recent and leading SNs are Facebook (Facebook Inc., 2015), 
LinkedIn (LinkedIn Corporation, 2011), Twitter (Twitter Inc., 2014), or content-sharing 
networks such as YouTube (YouTube LLC, 2014) and Flickr (Yahoo! Inc., 2004). In 
these (and other) SNs, a person seeks to discover like-minded or compatible people with 
interests or experiences similar to theirs (Chatterjee, 2013). Most recent SNs combine 
elements of various types of information, such as music, photos, videos, blogs, links, and 
third party applications. 
The practice of social networking has exploded, with millions of users across many 
and various web-based services. SNs have become an important part of user social 
identity. People use their personal information to create a social profile, and then devote 
substantial time and energy to maintaining and manipulating their online persona in the 
SNs. Thus, SNs have transformed the web into a new medium for social communities to 
share personal data such as contacts, pictures, activities, and other personally identifiable 
information (PII). The intent of SNs is to facilitate connection and sharing, however, 
sharing personal data has consequences and SNs users and specialists are looking at the 
privacy impact of such large-scale sharing; for example, 90% of 5,627 respondents in  
22 countries expressed anxiety about information privacy and ranked privacy issues as 
troubling and expressed anxiety about information privacy (KPMG International 
Cooperative, 2010). 
There is a fundamental conflict between SN objectives and privacy protection. By 
definition, SNs promote sharing through SN functionalities; this sharing is the very 
purpose of their existence. Privacy is not considered evil; indeed, in some circumstances, 
any necessary protection may itself be considered evil by some SN users. The question  
is, therefore, how SN users can be empowered to define their own (flexible and 
changeable) privacy preferences, and how they might be assured that protection is 
suitably implemented to deliver these preferences through SN functionalities. The 
primary objective is, therefore, to understand and manage user privacy requirements and 
protection as a mechanism for delivering reliably managed privacy policies through SN 
functionalities. 
The privacy problem is complex: users want privacy but they seldom know  
‘how to specify’ and ‘what to seek’ for their own privacy (Shapiro, 2010). Embedded 
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privacy-enhancing technology (PET) (Blarkom et al., 2003); at the design level of SNs 
architectures can be the solution for ensuring privacy from the beginning of a system’s 
development. PET is a coherent information and communication technology (ICT) 
system that protects privacy by eliminating or reducing unnecessary disclosure, 
collection, retention, sharing, or trading of personal data without losing the functionality 
of information systems. 
This paper provides an overview of the current literature pertaining to privacy in SNs 
architectures. This area is of particular interest both in academia and in industry since 
SNs are so saturated. Hodge (2006) aptly points out that SNs are designed as public 
spaces for the private individual; however, since individuals use these public spaces to 
disseminate their personal information, the networks become the source of complex 
privacy issues. Additionally, user information should not be perpetually stored and 
accessed by the service provider. Stored information can be stolen or hacked, or a user 
account can be deactivated or reactivated at any later stage. It is likely that users would 
always wish for full ownership and control of their information so that they could turn off 
access at any time; however, in the current various SN paradigms, the owner of the 
information – service provider or user – remains unclear. This paper focuses on these SN 
privacy issues as documented by analysts, researchers, and users. In so doing, it 
determines the issues that need to be addressed in this area. 
In the following sections, we begin by examining studies of privacy protecting 
architectures. We then describe the studies of architecture models. Next, we outline the 
representative results of privacy protection mechanisms in SNs. The following section 
describes the studies of enterprise architecture methodologies. We conclude with a 
discussion of implications for future research and practice. 
2 Privacy protecting architectures 
In information systems, architectures can be classified into six categories based on 
architecture’s scope/objectives, business model, information system description, 
technology model detailed description and machine language description and each of 
these categories can be described for “what (e.g. data), how (e.g. function), where (e.g. 
network), who (e.g. people), when (e.g. time) and why (e.g. motivation)”. Therefore, 
altogether there are thirty-six possible information system architectures (Zachman, 1987). 
These architectural separations liberate us to classify privacy protecting architectures 
from single architectural perspective and viewed architectures into various perspectives. 
In the prior studies, architecture has been viewed ‘strategically’, ‘organisationally’ 
and ‘technologically’ (Iyer et al., 2007). This perspective, while influential individually, 
falls short to provide integrated view of architecture to analyse risk and decide upon 
resource allocation and this perspective often concentrate on idealised system instead of 
system in use (Iyer et al., 2007). Iyer and Gottlieb (2004) identified three views of the 
architectures: ‘architecture-in-design (AID)’; ‘emergent’ and ‘architecture-in-operation 
(AIO)’. The AID is also known as conceptual architecture (Iyer and Gottlieb, 2004) or 
‘espoused’ (Iyer and Gottlieb, 2004), defines and models the architecture and describes 
the planned dependences between system modules. The emergent view is the actual 
dependencies that exist among system modules which allows to merge and acquiesce 
applications into the enterprise. The third view – AIO or ‘architecture-in-use’ (Iyer and 
Gottlieb, 2004) sketches the dependencies that arise from the business of doing the work 
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of the enterprise such as ‘selling products’, ‘buying supplies’, ‘managing employees or 
suppliers’ or managing other stakeholders interact with the system. The AID is used to 
define enterprise model and requisite organisational resources and the AIO provides the 
content of the enterprise’s model. These views are also referred as sub-architectures and 
are of paramount importance in defining enterprise strategies (Iyer and Gottlieb, 2004). 
However, these sub-architectures may subsequently emerge from one to another and may 
be limited to provide a holistic view of the SNs architectures. 
In the current SNs paradigm particularly in client-server architecture, users store their 
information in the public storage in SNs and access their information by using various 
access mechanisms in the virtual space owned by the service provider. A variety of 
methods is available to store the information; however, these are limited in their 
application. An improved system architecture for the storage of user information is now 
necessary; ideally, the SN provider would provide public storage for private user 
information, but would be unable to view or access this information without the person’s 
explicit permission. So, examining privacy protecting architectures from a storing 
information standpoint might be useful since storing information is a significant 
challenge in SNs, particularly in terms of time link: information that was once public can 
be transformed to private information at a later stage, or private information can later be 
considered public information. In the client-server architecture SN paradigm, the service 
provider has the opportunity to search, view or access user information at any stage. 
While this is in line with the service provider’s policy to which users have agreed, the 
service provider can revise their privacy policy and disclose personal information to a 
third party at any time. 
There are five different system architectures for storing information in SNs  
this classification is inspired by the system architectures perspective by Chow and 
Mokbel (2009) for privacy-preserving location-based services. These are: client-server 
architecture (centralised architecture); third party architecture (similar to cloud-based 
architecture); distributed architecture (requiring fixed communication architecture,  
that is, a base station); peer-to-peer (P2P) or ubiquitous architecture (not requiring a fixed 
communication architecture); and wireless sensor networks (where sensor nodes provide 
aggregate information). Refer to Table 1 for architectures’ summaries with projects and 
privacy features. While prior research has shown that all these system architectures have 
various pros and cons, a number of issues such as information privacy and reliability 
remain unsolved. 
2.1 Client-server architecture 
Client-server architecture is also known as ‘centralised architecture’ and uses a central 
repository to store data about their users and their connection (Bortoli et al., 2009). The 
SN service providers facilitate a set of services such as finding other people, sharing 
pictures/videos, and exchanging professional and personal information. Some renowned 
SN services such as Facebook (Facebook Inc., 2015), MySpace (Myspace LLC, 2014) 
and LinkedIn (LinkedIn Corporation, 2011) are developed based on this architecture. 
Existing work in this architecture can be divided into: 
1 access control mechanism 
2 virtual and individual client/server approach 
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3 user-centric approach. 
With the access control mechanism, users may specify that certain of their profile items 
are accessible only by ‘friends’, ‘friends of friends’, or certain members in the friend list 
by using an access control list (Lugano and Saariluoma, 2007), multilevel access control 
list (Park et al., 2010), degree of relationship (Cai et al., 2009), or hidden friendship 
matching (Preibusch and Beresford, 2009). The users may iteratively capture their 
privacy preferences by using ‘Privacy Wizard’ (Fang and LeFevre, 2010) or may use an 
automated service such as ‘Privacy Butler’ (Wishart et al., 2010). However, in this 
approach, SN users are required to make a substantial effort and devote time to setting up 
access control for others so as to achieve partial privacy and protection from future 
privacy breaches. 
Virtual and individual client/servers (Cáceres et al., 2009) or personal databases such 
as ‘MyLifeBits’ (Park et al., 2010), and ‘Phonebookmark’ (Ekler and Lukovszki, 2010) 
can be used to store user data or identity (Beach et al., 2009) in an individual server, 
rather than uploading the data to a centralised server. Such a server might resolve privacy 
issues such as direct anonymity issues, indirect or K-anonymity issues, eavesdropping, 
spoofing, replay, or wormhole attacks and allows for the use of a location-based system 
without disclosing user identity. However, one limitation is that the system uses of 
centralised server, which may highlight user future privacy issues. 
In the user-centric approach, the user can manually or automatically set up their 
trustable mechanisms (VENETA; Von Arb et al., 2008), use a combined ontology for 
both class membership and family relationships (smart architecture, Noll et al., 2007). 
The user can also use a time capsule with timed and revocable decryptability to use SN 
services with anonymity and less trust in an external authority (Camenisch et al., 2009). 
However, this approach may not ensure overall service privacy, but may partially do so 
through a friend list or the selective sharing of information with service providers, or with 
friends, family and colleagues (‘PeopleFinder’; Sadeh et al., 2009). 
2.2 Distributed architecture 
SN services are decentralised and distributed across various providers in distributed 
architecture. The SN facilitates services through widgets, plug-ins or add-ons to 
implement functionality on user websites. This architecture is also known as federated 
SN architecture. Existing work in this architecture can be divided into (GNU social, 
2014b): 
1 commodity web hosting 
2 non-free software 
3 federation of servers 
4 P2P and distributed hash table (DHT) 
5 social desktop applications 
6 in-browser profile and certificates 
7 distributed node architecture. 
Refer to Section 4.3 for details description for these types of distributed architectures. 
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2.3 Third party architecture 
Third party architecture uses third party storage; this is also known as ‘anonymiser’ and 
is placed between users and service provider as a middle layer. This layer must satisfy 
user privacy requirements (Chow and Mokbel, 2009) while storing information. In this 
architecture, user information can be transformed into blurred, cloaked, hidden, or 
encrypted information and stored in: 
1 a trusted third party or broker [for example, ‘SmokeScreen’ (Cox et al., 2007)] 
2 an untrusted third party (Puttaswamy and Zhao, 2010). 
This transformed information will be unblurred, uncloaked, made visible or decrypted in 
client devices for further use. 
2.4 P2P or ubiquitous architecture 
In P2P or ubiquitous architecture, a user of a mobile or hand-held device can establish 
social networking by identifying another user who is both close by and using another 
mobile device (Chatterjee, 2013). This architecture generally uses overlay or logical 
networks. There is no fixed communication infrastructure or centralised/distributed 
servers; mobile users directly communicate to each other through the multi-hop routing 
P2P/DHT (GNU social, 2014b) approach. The users can engage in SN services such as 
sharing information, pictures, or locations. This approach might be one of the best for 
ensuring privacy as it allows any social interaction to be end-to-end or group encrypted. 
However, the P2P approach requires a special strategy for message delivery when a 
source server, DHT and/or group communication goes ‘offline’. Some examples of this 
type of SNs approach are: PeerSoN (PeerSoN, 2016) and Opera Unite (Opera Software 
ASA, 2011). 
2.5 Wireless sensor network architecture 
Wireless sensor network architecture is based on wireless sensor data. Existing work in 
this type of SN takes two main directions: 
1 dividing the system into hierarchical levels on physical units, for example,  
sub-rooms, rooms, floors, smart buildings or between cars 
2 providing an in-network information anonymisation algorithm, regardless of the 
system’s physical structure (Chow and Mokbel, 2009). 
In this architecture, SNs can be used as ‘storage infrastructures’ for sensor information 
(Breslin et al., 2009). Users can also avail themselves of both the capabilities of the 
Semantic Web and mobile ad-hoc networks to ensure privacy based on a simple  
number as the trust mechanism – such as the ‘BlueTrust’ system (Markides and Coetzee, 
2008) – or the friendship initiation system, ‘serendipity’, which is one of the initial 
Bluetooth-based systems (Eagle and Pentland, 2005). However, trust is more complex, 
and its regular occurrence in the Bluetooth range is not enough to create symmetric or 
asymmetric trust. Users can also initiate friendship by sharing their social networking ID, 
[e.g. WhoZThat (Beach et al., 2008)], extended to a context-aware component such as 
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Music Jukebox. However, this linkage to SN information may raise future privacy 
breaches. 
MyLifeBits is a personal database-based system which is based on converging and 
collaborative computing (Park et al., 2010). ‘Smart architecture’ enables SN user privacy 
based on the identity of the user, using a combined ontology for both class membership 
and family relationships (Noll et al., 2007). ‘Novel architecture’ is an accountable 
privacy-supporting service which uses time capsule (Camenisch et al., 2009). These 
architectures partially or completely address privacy issues using their own built-in 
systems. However, they too have limitations; for example, MyLifeBits was not verified in 
a real life environment or smart architecture, and overall user privacy was partially 
substantiated through an access control mechanism for a SN’s friend list, but was not 
confirmed overall. 
End-to-end privacy protection should be integrated into the design stage of SN 
service development. Although many designers incorporate privacy protection techniques 
for a particular component of their SN, the literature reveals that for optimum safety, they 
need to be embedded at the design stage. 
Table 1 Architectures’ summaries with privacy features 
Project name Features Privacy support 
Architecture type: client-server architecture 
1 Facebook  
(Facebook Inc., 
2015) 
Structure: news feed, friend, wall, 
timeline, like, messages, inbox 
notifications, networks and groups. 
Applications: events, marketplace, 
notes, places, platform, questions, 
photos, videos and Facebook paper. 
General features: credits, feature 
phones, graph search, IPv6, listen with 
friends, Facebook Live, mood faces, 
phone, poke, smart phone integration, 
subscribe, ticker, URL shortener, 
verified accounts, hash tagging feature, 
introducing say thanks, impressum and 
call to action button 
Extensive but users are 
required to make a 
substantial effort and 
devote time for setting  
up privacy. Unclear data 
ownership and users grant a 
non-exclusive, transferable, 
sub-licensable, royalty-free, 
worldwide license to use 
any IP content that they 
post on or in connection 
with Facebook 
2 MySpace  
(Myspace LLC, 
2014) 
Bulletin board, Groups, embed 
YouTube videos, instant messenger, 
MySpaceTV, mobile phone version, 
news, classifieds, applications, audio 
recordings, polls forum system and 
status update feature 
Extensive but users are 
required to make a 
substantial effort and 
devote time for setting  
up privacy. Unclear data 
ownership and automatic 
data storing and collection 
by MySpace Services and 
their third-party service 
providers increase the risk 
of privacy issues 
Note: *Some of the distributed architectures1, features and privacy support are adapted 
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Table 1 Architectures’ summaries with privacy features (continued) 
Project name Features Privacy support 
Architecture type: client-server architecture 
3 LinkedIn (LinkedIn 
Corporation, 2011) 
User profile network, security and 
technology, applications, mobile, 
groups, job listings, online recruiting, 
skills, publishing platform, influencers, 
advertising and for-pay research 
Extensive but users are 
required to make a 
substantial effort and 
devote time for setting up 
privacy. They may have 
access to user data which is 
a threat to user’s privacy. 
4 Twitter  
(Twitter Inc., 2014) 
Tweets, content, format, trending 
topics, adding and following content, 
verified accounts, mobile, 
authentication, related headlines feature
Yes but the service 
provider have access to 
user data which is a threat 
to user’s privacy. 
5 Privacy Wizard 
(Fang and LeFevre, 
2010) 
Iteratively capture user’s privacy 
preferences by using ‘Privacy Wizard’ 
Yes through  
‘Privacy Wizard’ 
6 Privacy Butler 
(Wishart et al., 2010) 
Use of an automated service Yes through automated 
‘Privacy Butler’ service 
7 MyLifeBits  
(Park et al., 2010) 
Use personal database Yes through personal 
database 
8 Phonebook  
mark (Ekler and 
Lukovszki, 2010) 
Store user data or identity in an 
individual server, rather than uploading 
the data to a centralised server 
Protect privacy by storing 
user data or identity in an 
individual server, rather 
than uploading the data to a 
centralised server 
9 VENETA (Von Arb 
et al., 2008) 
User can manually or automatically set 
up their trustable mechanisms 
Yes through trustable 
mechanisms 
10 Smart architecture  
(Noll et al., 2007) 
Uses of a combined ontology for  
both class membership and family 
relationships 
Provide privacy feature 
through combined ontology 
11 Novel architecture  
(Camenisch et al., 
2009) 
Use time capsule with timed and 
revocable decryptability to use SN 
services with anonymity and less trust 
in an external authority 
Yes 
Architecture type: distributed architecture* 
1 6d2 Blog, media library, address book, 
themeable, private messaging 
Address book to send  
posts to either individuals 
or groups. 
2 Ampify3 Trust-based search Provides fine grained 
privacy control through 
object capability security 
and transport layer 
encryption. 
3 Anahita4 Anahita is an open source social 
networking platform for building 
knowledge sharing apps and services 
 
Note: *Some of the distributed architectures, features and privacy support are adapted 
from Wikimedia Foundation Inc. (2015). 
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Table 1 Architectures’ summaries with privacy features (continued) 
Project name Features Privacy support 
Architecture type: distributed architecture* 
4 Appleseed5 Photos, journals, messaging, groups, 
privacy controls, status updates, 
newsfeeds 
Friend circles used to 
categorise friends and 
restrict/allow access 
5 Buddycloud6 Personal and topic channels, 
Buddycloud directory, channel search, 
channel recommender, media server, 
friend-finder, mobile and e-mail push 
service, location, messaging 
Yes 
6 Cunity7 Friends, photo album, filesharing, 
messaging, pinboard, news feed, 
member list, forum, connecting cunities
Yes 
7 Diaspora*8 Status messages, blogging, photo 
sharing, privacy enhanced 
Yes, through ‘aspects’ 
8 DiSo Project9 Open, non-proprietary and 
interoperable decentralised social web 
Not found 
9 DSNP10 Provides the social web into an open 
space were everyone is free to 
contribute to an ecosystem of software 
and techniques 
Through RSA asymmetric 
key 
10 Duuit!11 Search, micro-blogging, e-mail, photos, 
videos, blogs, web pages, XMPP chat, 
video chat, collaborative drawing, 
document creation and editing, feed 
reader, profiles, files, games, groups, 
mood, privacy controls, customisable 
interface 
Excellent, acl, granular, 
profile, avatar, content 
11 Friend2Friend12 Strong encryption, XML for all data 
exchange, data is digitally signed 
Connect to known 
individuals. 
12 Friendica13 Rich profiles, networking groups, 
community/group/celebrity pages, 
richtext status (not specifically length 
limited), photo albums, YouTube share, 
location, like/dislike, multiple profiles 
w/assignment to specific friends, single 
sign on to post directly to friend’s 
profiles on co-operating systems. 
Communications encryption. Fans and 
one-way relationships. Local and 
global directory services. Ability to 
restrict connection endpoints. 
Extensive 
13 GNU Social14 Micro blogging Yes but not clear ‘how’ 
14 Jappix15 XMPP client + Micro blogging Excellent: based on 
presence authorisations 
Note: *Some of the distributed architectures, features and privacy support are adapted 
from Wikimedia Foundation Inc. (2015). 
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Table 1 Architectures’ summaries with privacy features (continued) 
Project name Features Privacy support 
Architecture type: distributed architecture* 
15 Knowee16 OpenID signup, activity stream import 
and export, contact import from  
Web 2.0 services via XFN and FOAF, 
automatically updated address book 
from remote data sources, consolidated 
profile with RDF/FOAF export, 
personal SPARQL API 
Yes but USER authorises 
KNOWEE to disclose the 
data supplied by the user by 
any means stated in them 
16 Kopal17 OpenID Core, multiple profiles Not found 
17 Kune18 real-time collaborative edition, XMPP 
chat, groups, calendar, lists, tasks, 
blogs, Apache Wave inbox (modern  
e-mail), wave extensions (gadgets, 
robots), public web pages, profiles, 
galleries (photos, videos), maps, 
federation, usability 
Excellent 
18 Lipsync.it19 Synchronisation tool inspired by 
Dropbox 
Yes 
19 Libertree20 SN No 
20 Lorea21 22 Profiles, micro blogging, streams, 
groups, plugins, group mailing lists, 
tasks, calendar, subgroups, tag clouds 
Excellent 
21 Movim23 XMPP client + Micro blogging Not yet 
22 Mr. Privacy24  Yes 
23 Newebe25 One user = one node; micro blogging, 
picture sharing, activity stream 
 
24 NoseRub26  Not found 
25 ObjectCloud27 Customisation, flexible hosting, 
security, application platform 
Yes 
26 OneSocial Web28 Micro blogging Yes 
27 OpenAutonomy29 Micro-blogging, RSS aggregation, 
cloud storage 
Trusted user list and fine-
grained trusted sub-groups 
28 OpenLink Data 
Spaces (ODS)30 
Profile management, blogs, wikis, 
address books, calendars, feed 
aggregation, discussion forums 
(includes NNTP support), file servers 
(WebDAV-based briefcase). 
WebID and others 
29 OpenMicroBlogger31 User-toggleable ‘apps’ to add/remove 
functionality. RSSCloud and partial 
OStatus (PubSubHubbub) federation as 
well as Open Microblogging 0.1. Local 
follow/unfollow. Facebook, Twitter, 
Flickr integration. (partial) Twitter API 
support. Fully Restful design, user 
interface consumes Rest API. 
Yes 
Note: *Some of the distributed architectures, features and privacy support are adapted 
from Wikimedia Foundation Inc. (2015). 
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Table 1 Architectures’ summaries with privacy features (continued) 
Project name Features Privacy support 
Architecture type: distributed architecture* 
30 Project Danube32 1 Sharing personal data with 
companies/organisations) 
2 Sharing personal data with ‘friends’
3 Use of personal data for ‘personal 
applications’ 
Not found 
31 Project Nori33 Personal data store (PDS)  
(a.k.a. personal data locker) 
Not found but could be 
possible centralise control 
for the user through ‘PDS’ 
32 Psyced34 Profiles, chat, micro blogging Yes by running user’s own 
server so data still resides 
with users. 
33 Pump.io35 Stream server supporting social 
networking capabilities 
Yes 
34 RedMatrix36 Decentralised identity platform, also 
provides blogs, rich social networking, 
cloud storage and internet-scale access 
control/privacy 
Extensive 
35 Retroshare37 Private messaging  
36 Safebook  
(Cutillo et al., 2010) 
 Extensive, including 
communication 
untraceability 
37 Salut Ã Toi38 Multi-frontends, micro blogging, group 
micro blogging, file sharing, games, 
XMPP client 
through XMPP groups, 
presence authorisation 
38 SMOB39 Micro blogging Not found 
39 Social-Igniter40 Friends, places, status, comments, 
modular apps (messages, blog, cart, 
media), themes, mobile themes, 3rd 
party integration (Facebook, Twiter, 
YouTube), editable widgets, 
Yes 
40 SocialRiver41  Private messaging,  
privacy controls 
41 SocialZE42  Yes 
42 SocknetProvider-
FoolishMortal.org43 
profiles, messaging, enables internet 
content sharing 
No 
43 Sone44 Micro blogging, media library, 
decentralised spam protection 
Yes, multiple anonymous 
identities, private messages 
via the Freemail plugin 
with Forward_secrecy 
44 Sparkleshare45 Collaboration and sharing tool inspired 
by dropbox 
Yes, encryption option 
Note: *Some of the distributed architectures, features and privacy support are adapted 
from Wikimedia Foundation Inc. (2015). 
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Table 1 Architectures’ summaries with privacy features (continued) 
Project name Features Privacy support 
Architecture type: distributed architecture* 
45 Tent46 Profiles, developer-extensible post and 
profile types, data import, groups, 
privacy controls, content versioning 
Yes granular permissions 
(access control lists for all 
content) 
46 Thimbl47 Micro blogging Not found 
47 Twister48 Micro blogging Yes end-to-end encryption 
for private messages 
48 Weestit49  Yes 
Architecture type: third party architecture 
1 Smoke Screen  
(Cox et al., 2007) 
Use trusted third party or broker Yes through trusted third 
party or broker 
Architecture type: Peer-to-peer or ubiquitous architecture 
1 PeerSoN  
(PeerSoN, 2016) 
Establish social networking by 
identifying another user who is both 
close by and using another mobile 
device 
Yes peer-to-peer trust 
2 Opera Unite (Opera 
Software ASA, 2011) 
  
Architecture type: wireless sensor network architecture 
1 BlueTrust (Markides 
and Coetzee, 2008) 
Semantic Web and mobile ad-hoc 
networks, a simple number as the trust 
mechanism 
Ensure privacy based on a 
simple number as the trust 
mechanism 
2 Serendipity (Eagle 
and Pentland, 2005) 
Friendship initiation system Bluetooth-based trust 
systems for friends 
3 WhoZThat (Beach  
et al., 2008) 
Users can also initiate friendship by 
sharing their social networking ID 
Not yet 
Note: *Some of the distributed architectures, features and privacy support are adapted 
from Wikimedia Foundation Inc. (2015). 
3 Architecture models 
The purpose of this section is to define the business architecture models and various 
privacy models, in order to scope the SN to which the privacy-preserving architecture is 
applicable. The various privacy models available to protect user information between 
connected stakeholders are the access control model, minimal information sharing, and 
the third party model. 
3.1 Access control model 
The access control model is used to ensure privacy by setting up access control for the 
SN stakeholders. Figure 1 shows this model where users can control access for service 
providers and stakeholders through a service provider. For the ‘access control model’, the 
target architecture uses the privacy model to control access for the data types [Refer 
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Figure 1, ignoring the minimal information (2) and the information anonymiser’s third 
party (3) component]. Service providers will pre-define the privacy model and SN users 
have the flexibility to customise it. 





































































However, access control is inherently inadequate to address privacy on the internet.  
The access control paradigm can be described as discretionary access control, as the 
‘need-to-know’ access model, or as role-based access control (Fong et al., 2009). With 
this model, stakeholders have little control over how their data is used and accessed 
(Kagal and Abelson, 2010). 
3.2 Minimal information sharing model 
The minimal information sharing model performs cryptographic techniques such as join 
and intersection operations, or secures information. However, the computational cost and 
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the inability to facilitate other queries make this paradigm unsuitable for real time 
applications (Chow, 2010). 
Other solutions, such as ‘de-identification’ by removing or modifying PII  
(that is, social security numbers, driver license numbers or financial accounts) and  
‘re-identification’ whenever individual and sensitive information is needed (Narayanan 
and Shmatikov, 2010), can be part of the system architecture. While differential privacy 
can ensure good privacy protection in the architecture, it is inadequate with respect to 
data accessibility. 
For the ‘Minimal information sharing’, the target architecture uses the minimal 
information sharing component inside the service provider platform [Refer Figure 1, 
ignoring the direct link between users’ platform and service provider information (1) and 
anonymiser’s third party (3) component]. Service providers will store partial information 
based on their preferred minimal sharing algorithm. 
3.3 Third party model 
The third party model engages a third party to protect SN user information. This model is 
further divided into the untrustworthy third party and trustworthy third party models. The 
untrustworthy third party model engages an untrusted third party, which executes queries 
by collecting secure information from multiple data sources (Chow, 2010). However, the 
computational cost and the emphasis on processing and securing information from 
multiple data sources make this paradigm unsuitable for real time applications. The trusty 
third party model engages a third party trusted by users and acts as a middle layer 
between the database server and users, to process information (Chow, 2010). This 
paradigm is already engaged in various location-based services. 
For the ‘third party model’, the architecture uses anonymiser as third party storage to 
protect user privacy, and consists of three logical technology components: user platform, 
information anonymiser, and service provider platform [Refer Figure 1, ignoring the 
direct link between users’ platform and service provider information (1) and the minimal 
information (2) component]. Information anonymiser works as a middle layer between 
user and service provider. 
A trusted third party could be engaged to protect SN user information; however, there 
are both strong supporters and strong opponents of both the minimal information sharing 
model, which uses cryptographic techniques to share minimum information (Agrawal  
et al., 2003a), and trusted third party models, which use a third party server to protect 
user privacy (Aggarwal et al., 2004; Jefferies et al., 1996). 
The computational cost and inability to facilitate the performance of every 
cryptographic technique query makes the minimal information sharing paradigm 
unsuitable for real time applications (Chow, 2010). On the other hand, the trusted third 
party model is already used by existing location privacy techniques (Mokbel et al., 2006; 
Xu and Cai, 2007, 2008; Peng et al., 2008; Kalnis et al., 2007; Gruteser and Grunwald, 
2003; Gedik and Liu, 2008; Chow et al., 2006; Chow and Mokbel, 2007; Bamba et al., 
2008; Beresford and Stajano, 2003). It is commercially engaged in ensuring online user 
privacy in: PayPal (1999–2016) for buying and selling products; anonymiser50 for 
anonymous surfing; and in Wi-Fi protection. However, the third party must be 
completely and highly trusted for the storage and sharing of information (Agrawal et al., 
2003a). 
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4 Privacy protection mechanisms 
SN users have ultimate ownership of their personal data and can take control to ensure its 
privacy. Users may share private information with friends and (often) strangers. In so 
doing, however, major concerns can include being identified by malicious adversaries, 
and having sensitive relationships revealed (Liu et al., 2010). SN users can, however, 
manage their personal and private information via a well-informed approach, such as 
access control for other SN users, or advanced mechanisms such as privacy by  
friends-of-a-friend prediction. Setting up such privacy protection mechanisms, however, 
requires significant effort and may lead SN users to accept the default setting; this 
eventually results in a loss of privacy and loss of control over one’s personal information. 
4.1 Privacy by access control 
Privacy can be seen as a companion to access control for linked members on SNs. 
Currently, users are required to make a substantial effort in, and devote significant time 
to, setting up access controls for other individuals in order to protect themselves from 
privacy breaches. 
There are several ways in which users can implement access control: 
1 they may be technically adept enough to understand the privacy settings of the SN 
2 they might be able to employ a mobile access control list (MACL), a privacy control 
mechanism which considers ‘user attitude’, ‘user communication history’ and ‘social 
aspect’ (Lugano and Saariluoma, 2007) 
3 they might ensure privacy by using a SN Privacy Wizard template (Fang and 
LeFevre, 2010), which iteratively captures a limited number of user inputs to  
assign privacy ‘labels’ to selected friends and infers a user privacy preference 
4 they can utilise ‘Privacy Butler’, an automated service which monitors privacy 
policies and filters unwanted activities of connected friends (Wishart et al., 2010) 
5 they can avail themselves of the advantages of the capabilities of both the Semantic 
Web and mobile adhoc networks to ensure privacy based on a simple number as the 
trust mechanism, such as the ‘BlueTrust’ system (Markides and Coetzee, 2008); 
however, trust is more complex and, while regularly available in the Bluetooth range, 
the system may not provide symmetric or asymmetric trust. 
4.2 Privacy by friends-of-a-friend prediction 
Privacy can be achieved through new concepts such as ‘friends-of-friends’, which are 
based on symmetric or asymmetric scenarios. Privacy by friends-of-a friend prediction 
has drawn the attention of social researchers who hold that everybody on the  
planet is connected by ‘six degree relationships’: your friends belong to a ‘one degree 
relationship’; friends of your friends belong to a ‘two degree relationship’; and so on (Cai 
et al., 2009). The user can apply varying levels of control to the publishing and sharing of 
information or resources according to the friend-of-a-friend relationship theory. 
‘Serendipity’, for example, is one of the initial Bluetooth-based systems which 
demonstrates the friendship initiation system (Eagle and Pentland, 2005); however, it 
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does not utilise WiFi, and is not extendable to Multihop mesh networking similar to 
‘WhoZThat’, which ties mobile smart phones to multiple SNs and initiates friendships by 
sharing social networking ID (Beach et al., 2008) extended to a context-aware 
component, such as Music Jukebox; however, linking to SN information may cause 
future privacy breaches. 
Friendships can be hidden but can be revealed by using secure hashing identifiers, 
and friends-of-a-friend can be matched through hashed key to disclose unilateral 
friendships. This hidden friendship matching technique avoids privacy-depleting 
consequences (Preibusch and Beresford, 2009). Raban et al. (2009) describe mechanisms 
for exploring relationship between strangers, and recommends a ‘restrictive profile’ for 
mobile devices. Their investigation incorporates two established theoretical approaches – 
uncertainty reduction theory (URT) and predicted outcome value theory (POV) – to 
develop an efficient introduction mechanism between users based on synchronous 
progressive disclosure of personal information. 
Link prediction algorithms to anonymise a dynamic SN is one of the privacy 
preserving techniques (Bhagat et al., 2010). Bhagat et al. propose clustering methods  
that consequently provides guaranteed anonymity against adversaries with limited 
background knowledge; however, the personal information which SN users provide could 
be misused and tampered with. The connection linking mechanism is also a SN focus 
area. New connections are always essential elements of a SN; however, it is crucial to 
choose valid connections. 
4.3 Web service federated or distributed perspective 
Privacy can be assured through new concepts of web services federation or distribution. 
The federation or distributed approach can be composed and compared as various 
approaches such as (GNU social, 2014b): 
1 commodity web hosting 
2 non-free software 
3 federation of servers 
4 P2P and DHT 
5 social desktop applications 
6 in-browser profile and certificates 
7 distributed node architecture. 
4.3.1 Commodity webhosting 
In the commodity web hosting (GNU social, 2014b) approach, web services are often 
deployed on virtual machines or commodity web hosting. Some examples of this type of 
service are StatusNet (StatusNet Inc., 2010), and Diaspora (Diaspora, 2010). However, 
encryption, security and privacy are not safe on virtual machines, and the federation on 
these machines and servers cannot handle as much traffic as applications using optimised 
protocols rather than HTTP. 
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4.3.2 Non-free software 
Non-free software-based (GNU social, 2014b) services hide user data and only allow its 
sharing based on attribute-based encryption; examples are iSocial (iSocial ITN, 2014) 
and Persona (Baden et al., 2009). However, privacy should not intend to simply hide user 
data as, although hidden, it will remain in the system and can still become the cause of 
future privacy incidents. 
4.3.3 Federation of servers 
Server federation (GNU social, 2014b) approaches use existing server infrastructure  
and traditional internet architecture; some examples are OneSocialWeb (Vodafone 
Group, 2010) and XMPP (The Internet Engineering Task Force, 2014). However, these 
approaches construct services using a certain degree of unencrypted trust in the servers. 
4.3.4 P2P/DHT 
The P2P and DHT (GNU social, 2014b) approach can be considered as one of the best 
privacy approaches, as it provides for any social interaction to be end-to-end or group 
encrypted; some examples of this approach are SNs are PeerSoN (PeerSoN, 2016), 
Safebook (Cutillo et al., 2010), Friend2Friend (Altruists International, 2001) and Opera 
Unite (Opera Software ASA, 2011). Some fine-tuned technologies improve their services 
by concealing the identities of those involved in a communication. However, availability 
of services is still doubtful since the services need a special strategy for message delivery 
when a source goes ‘offline’ with a redundancy between servers, DHT, and/or group 
communication. 
4.3.5 Social desktop applications 
Social desktop application (GNU social, 2014b) approaches allow end to end encryption 
for people and groups without engaging a web browser, and provide richer interactions 
beyond traditional SNs. Examples of this type of application are Nepomuk for KDE 
(KDE, 2014) and Social Desktop for KDE (KDE, 2009). While these applications 
provide computer desktop experience integration, they could be the source of possible 
privacy issues similar to client-server approach. 
4.3.6 In-browser profile and certificates 
The In-browser profile and certificates (GNU social, 2014b) approach stores secure user 
profile locally in the browser and authenticates it at any website; external websites are not 
able to breach it using Friend of a Friend+Secure Socket Layer (FOAF+SSL) protocol. 
An example in this category is Lorea (2010). In this approach, FOAF+SSL securely 
includes a link to a profile request by the web browser, and can be hosted on commodity 
web hosting. However, this approach includes a layer of complexity without solving the 
privacy issues; this is because creating a forum and micro blogging requires some sort of 
hosting, and group encryption is not possible in this approach. The user also needs to surf 
websites to receive profiles and information updates and there is no real-time notification 
stream; these are other drawbacks of this approach. 
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4.3.7 Distributed node architecture 
Distributed node architecture (GNU social, 2014b) separates an end user’s social node 
into five components – ‘core’, ‘UI’, ‘core transports’, ‘datastore modules’, and ‘UI 
transports’ – and defines a framework for their interaction; Distnode (GNU social, 2014a) 
is an example of this category. This approach facilitates end-to-end encryption for people 
and groups, and the use of transport protocols such as HTTP, XMPP, or PSYC for 
relaying data between nodes. The approach also allows users to access the same account 
using various client programs such as Web Browser, Dedicated App and MeMenu. This 
approach is impressive but there is the possibility of over-design. 
Interoperability between these federated services, which is inadequately addressed  
by the services, can be conquered by various privacy languages. There are also  
many privacy languages available for representing policies in a human-readable and 
machine-readable format (Kumaraguru et al., 2007), such as: ‘Platform for Privacy 
Preferences (P3P)’ (Cranor et al., 2002b); ‘A P3P Preference Exchange Language 
(APPEL)’ (Cranor et al., 2002a); ‘Customer Profile Exchange (CPExchange)’ (Bohrer 
and Holland, 2000); ‘Privacy Rights Markup Language (PRML)’ (Zero-Knowledge 
Systems Inc., 2004); ‘XML Access Control Language (XACL)’ (Kudo and Hada, 2000); 
‘Platform for Enterprise Privacy Practices (E-P3P)’ (Karjoth et al., 2003); ‘Security 
Assertion Markup Language (SAML)’ (SSTC, 2004); ‘Rei’ (Kagal et al., 2005); 
‘eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)’ (OASIS Standard, 2005); 
‘Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL)’ (Ashley et al., 2003); ‘X-Path 
Based Preference Language (XPref)’(Agrawal et al., 2003b); ‘Declarative Privacy 
Authorization Language (DPAL)’ (Barth et al., 2004); ‘Geographic Location Privacy 
(Geopriv)” (Schulzrinne et al., 2007); and ODRL (Iannella, 2002). However, while these 
privacy languages are useful for interoperability between new or existing SNs, it is 
necessary to address the privacy issues for these SN services. 
Privacy preservation should not be partial but should ensure end-to-end preservation 
for SNs. Enterprises and service providers are accountable for the complete protection of 
the privacy of all SN users. Ensuring privacy at the system design level by using Privacy 
by Design (PbD) or other technologies can be the future privacy protection solution for 
SN users. 
4.4 Privacy by innovative architecture 
Researchers have designed various innovative SN architectures to protect privacy in SNs; 
for example, Matryoshka structure (Cutillo et al., 2010) and Contrail (Studi et al., 2010) 
provide an innovative and complete solution to preserve privacy, data integrity, data 
availability and data lookup. P2P architecture is used in the Matryoshka structure, and 
cloud-based P2P architecture is used in Contrail. However, the feasibility of the P2P SN 
architecture in terms of availability of data and responsiveness of the system is still an 
open question; additionally, no existing large-scale SN has been considered for Contrail. 
One of the specific limitations of the Contrail system is that the pre-trusted assumption 
between two users implies synchronous mutual trust; however, trust can be 
asynchronous. Another limitation of Contrail is that it assumes that the cloud is reliable 
and will not lose any data; however, cloud privacy is another issue for future research. 
Other solutions, such as ‘de-identification’ by removing or modifying PII (such as 
social security numbers, driver’s license numbers or financial accounts) and 
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‘reidentification’ whenever individual and sensitive information is needed (Narayanan 
and Shmatikov, 2010) can be part of the system architecture. Additionally, differential 
privacy can ensure effective privacy protection in the architecture; however, Narayanan 
and Shmatikov’s (2010) findings might have been much more convincing if the they had 
considered data accessibility in the proposed process. 
Figure 2 PbD principles (see online version for colours) 
 
Source: Cavoukian (2009) 
4.5 Privacy protecting principles 
There are various principles available for protecting privacy. These principles are Fair 
Information Principles (FIPs) (United States Federal Trade Commission, 1973), 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Principles 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002), CSA Model Code 
Principles (CSA Group, 2014), Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) (Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner, 1988b), National Privacy principles (NPPs) 
(Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 1988a), Nine Architectural 
Principles (Diamond et al., 2008), and PbD principles (Cavoukian, 2009). 
FIPs are included in the national level but do not includes in the federal level, and no 
safeguards exist to ensure that these principles are implemented (Diamond et al., 2008). 
Another major weakness is that the principles allow agencies to use private sector data 
without any appropriate protections from law. OECD Principles are confined to  
the European Union directive to protect personal data; however, those principles are 
strengthened, particularly in ‘consent’ and ‘accountability’, in the CSA Model Code 
Principles. The Nine Architectural Principles are designed especially to protect privacy in 
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a networked environment (Diamond et al., 2008). IPPs manage personal information for 
government agencies, whereas the NPPs regulate the private sector. 
4.5.1 Privacy by design 
The term PbD (Cavoukian, 2009) was conceived by Dr. Ann Cavoukian in early 1990. 
Gradually, she has distilled PbD into seven key principles; however, these principles 
remain at the conceptual stage. To comply with the PbD concept and to ensure privacy, a 
system needs to be systematic, predictable and repeatable (Cavoukian, 2009). Figure 2 
shows the PbD principles. Refer to Table 2 for the PbD principles details and examples. 
Table 2 PbD principles and examples 
PbD principle Analysis and examples 




Privacy protection comes before-the-fact, not after. This principle dictates 
that information privacy will be considered and ensured before problems 
arise. 
Conducting a privacy impact assessment (PIA) is one of the early approaches 
to preventing privacy threats (Cavoukian and Spencer, 2010); however, the 
PIA should be repeated and updated after a period of time (say, half-yearly or 
yearly). Cavoukian and Spencer (2010) also demonstrate a practical case 
study, utilising PbD principles pro-actively. In this case study, the Ontario 
Health Study team pro-actively provided de-identified protected information 
to assist researchers to enable further comprehensive studies of cancer, 
vascular diseases, and other chronic diseases. The case study also found that 
physical privacy another proactive consideration as important as information 
privacy; if the former is not provided, the respondents may not feel 
comfortable in providing the protected information. Radio frequency 
identification (RFID) within the health sector is an area that requires privacy 
measures (Cavoukian, 2009). Cavoukian (2009) suggested that RFID usage 
in this sector should not be linked to personal identifiers so as to avoid 
potential short or long-term threats to personal privacy proactively. 
Williams and Weber-Jahnke (2010) provide three solutions to privacy 
breaches in healthcare SNs. These are: the use of automated queries to detect 
false user accounts; the development of improved business processes to 
detect credentialed users; and preventing users from locating hidden network 
information. These solutions can also be considered in other privacy-invasive 
areas. 
As a precaution, users should be well informed about the privacy policy and 
conditions and terms of use of a SN. They should always be told: ‘who’ will 
access their private information; ‘how’ it will be accessed; and ‘where’ it will 
be accessed in the SN. However, a lengthy, text-based privacy policy is not 
sufficient as the user seldom reads such privacy policies (Kelley et al., 2009); 
rather, service providers should provide graphical-based understandable 
privacy policies. 
Preventive rather than remedial privacy features must be an aim for SNs; 
however, raising user awareness of privacy issues, as well as the provision of 
proactive features, can assist in improving privacy before breaches occur. 
The user must be aware that their SN profile is linked to their real world 
social identity; they should also be aware that failing to protect their own 
privacy will eventually also increase the threat and risk to the privacy of 
friends and family. 
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Table 2 PbD principles and examples (continued) 
PbD principle Analysis and examples 
2 Privacy as 
the default 
Privacy as the default ensures that no action is required on the part of the 
individual to protect their privacy; it is built into the system by default, and 
information use and collection is determined by a respect for individual 
privacy. Privacy should be built into the SN system to protect a user’s private 
information and to ensure privacy by default. This is necessary as personal 
information in the user’s SN profile can represent and/or replicate their social 
identity. Thus, if the service provider reveals the user profile information to a 
third party, it may be harmful to the user. 
There are many ways in which service providers can build automatic privacy 
features into the systems; for examples: 
1 Privacy settings should not include an opt-in approach to automatically 
disclose private and protected information (The removal of this opt-in 
approach might avoid unwanted disclosure problems) (Cavoukian, 2009). 
2 When the user initially engages in a SN, the default settings must not 
disclose any protected information such as location information, e-mail 
address, date of birth or financial information (A possible approach could 
be to use a pseudonym for every user; hence, the service providers would 
not be able to access the actual name of that person and misuse their 
protected information). 
3 Friendship requests from other users must not be accepted or approved by 
default in the SN. 
4 Location-based features should be deactivated by default in the mobile 
SNs (Extra care should be taken while activating location-based services 
and information in a mobile SN; users may not be aware of the activated 
location-based service, which can eventually lead to a privacy breach). 
5 Providers can create a user-centric identity management infrastructure  
(If there are any changes in the system, the user has to approve the updates 
and receive feedback for the changes in the system. After some time, the 
user might feel comfortable and satisfied with the system’s privacy; at that 
point, they might choose to change their privacy settings (Ahern et al., 
2007) and relax their privacy requirements). 
6 Information can be generalising after a period of time (Williams and 
Weber-Jahnke, 2010) by automatically generalising the accessible 
information to an inactive connection (for example, the connection 
between a user and health care provider can be degraded over many years 
in a healthcare SN). 
Built-in default privacy might be advantageous; however, it could cause the 
user to be relaxed about their privacy and to fail to verify the system’s default 
privacy features. While it is unlikely, in reality, these settings themselves can 
be a source of various privacy breaches (such as leaking information to an 
untrustworthy third party). Therefore, the user should be well informed about 
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Table 2 PbD principles and examples (continued) 




Privacy embedded in design is a key issue in implementing privacy. One of 
the privacy-invasive systems – biometric encryption – could utilise PbD 
principles to provide privacy and ensure full functionality (Cavoukian and 
Stoianov, 2007). Such systems should be designed so that they store only  
the biometrically encrypted code, rather than the biometric information  
itself. In this approach, third parties will have less interest in collecting and 
accumulating actual biometric information; thus, embedded privacy in the 
design will protect user information and the required functionality will be 
ensured. 
Another privacy-invasive area is Video Surveillance which seeks to ensure 
public safety with respect to governance, but at the expense of the privacy of 
law-abiding citizens (Cavoukian, 2009). To address this privacy issue, one 
approach could be to publish general information on a website to inform 
citizens about the locations of public video surveillance and reasons for its 
installation. Another approach could be to strictly control the PII, such as face 
images and location data, and thus avoid unauthorised access. 
Williams and Weber-Jahnke (2010) suggest two privacy mechanisms that  
can be incorporated at the system design level. The first mechanism involves 
the adoption of only those architectures that allow for anonymity; the other 
requires that third parties comply with the system’s user privacy policy.  
In these ways, service providers can ensure the availability of information 
required by interested third parties through provided interfaces rather than 





It is possible to have both such as privacy vs. security. The principle 
underpinning the methodology is how to create full functionality while 
protecting individual privacy. 
The future of privacy-preserving SN applications is expected to be a win-win 
scenario: service providers’ business models will not be destroyed (Weiss, 
2009), and user privacy will be protected. Weiss (2009) proposes a privacy 
threat model that can be used to enhance information privacy to protect PII.  
In the proposed model, the SN application user will have fine-grained three 
dimensional controls over their PII. Such control is one of the fundamental 
requirements of major privacy laws in Europe. 
Obviously, a positive-sum paradigm is achievable in the system design 
(Cavoukian, 2009). There is a myth that one goal is achieved at the expense of 
another. This is not necessarily true, especially in the health sector; Cavoukian 
(2009), for example, demonstrate a framework which provides de-identified  
e-health records with a low level of re-identification risk. Hence, privacy and 
data quality is ensured. 
Similarly, biometric encryption ensures full functionality (Cavoukian, 2009) 
by storing biometrically encrypted codes only, rather than storing biometric 
information; hence, third parties will not be interested in collecting and storing 
actual biometric images. In addition, Cavoukian (2009) also examines  
(along with Bering Media’s Technology), the application of the positive-sum 
paradigm so that internet service providers (ISPs) can ensure they provide full 
functionality with zero disclosure of subscribers’ PII (Cavoukian and Emam, 
2010). With this innovative double-blind privacy architecture, ISPs never 
learn the physical location of the IP address for precise geo-locations (such as 
postal code or ZIP+4 information), and advertisers are referred to an identifier 
number without any actual details. 
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Table 2 PbD principles and examples (continued) 




PbD ensures cradle-to-grave, lifecycle management of information. The 
principle underpinning the assessment is how to secure information along  
with privacy. Williams and Weber-Jahnke (2010) describe possible solutions 
to end-to-end protection in the healthcare SN. One solution is anonymising 
network information if requested by interested parties such as governments, 
researchers or advertising companies. Another possible solution can be a  
fine-grained access control mechanism where user information can be 
accessed by third parties; in this way, others can access general information 
rather than actual information. 
Another example of an end-to-end protection solution is given by Narayanan 
and Shmatikov (2010). In this approach, individual and sensitive information 
can be ‘de-identified’ by removing or modifying PII (such as social security 
numbers, drivers’ license numbers or financial accounts). Narayanan and 
Shmatikov (2010) claim that differential privacy, de-identification and  
re-identification, are effective privacy protection. However, their findings 
might have been more convincing if they had considered data accessibility in 
the proposed process. 
Custodian or service providers must have procedures to securely dispose of 
personal records such as health records, SN member information or other  
PII in a timely manner. The user information can be discontinued for 
particular reasons (for example, someone is deceased) (Facebook Inc., 2015). 
Furthermore, precautionary measures can be taken to simplify the end-to-end 
protection process. One such precautionary measure could be the use of the 
physical security features already available for mobile phones; for example, 
not storing the password, never leaving the phone unattended, and reporting 
immediately if it is stolen. One precautionary measure to deal with the 
possibility of the latter can be to encrypt user information when transferring  
it to hand-held devices. Information can also be encrypted when the 
information is being transferred to a centralised server, and decrypted when it 
is transferred to a hand-held device to avoid communication privacy breaches. 
6 Visibility and 
transparent 
Trust but verify. The principle underpinning the investigation is how the 
accountable organisation will be open and honest with individual privacy. 
The accessing of information must be visible and transparent. For example, 
RFID cy technology can enhance visibility and transparency; however, 
wherever possible, it is necessary to minimise the identifiable, observable and 
linkable RFID information to prevent future threats to privacy (Cavoukian, 
2009). Additionally, the individual participant should be informed of any 
changes, so as to make the RFID system as open and transparent as possible. 
The user should have a transparent view of how any system is collecting their 
information. Delgado et al. (2010) propose a solution where a SN application 
indicates how it will collect the user’s information. In this way, the user will 
know which applications can access which information from their profile. 
Williams and Weber-Jahnke (2010) claim that mobile SN service providers 
might provide an unclear view of their privacy policies since these contain 
only text. They also claim that visibility has not been a strong point of SNs, 
and suggest that diagrams or interactive tools could be incorporated to 
increase the visibility or transparency of their policies. Nevertheless, a user 
could still have an unclear view of unexpected information propagation across 
the SN. It is also unlikely that the user will dispute the long textual privacy 
policies as this would mean that they would not be able to use the system. In 
most cases, a typical user does not read such policies (Kelley et al., 2009). 
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Table 2 PbD principles and examples (continued) 
PbD principle Analysis and examples 
7 Respect for 
user privacy 
Keep the system user-centric. The principle underpinning the investigation is 
how to share, disclose or access, rectify, delete, and block information that is 
consistent with respect to individual privacy. 
Roig (2010) concludes that privacy enhanced technology (PET) and 
transparency-enhancing technology (TET) are needed to be incorporated in 
the initial design level to ensure user privacy. Roig (2010) also claims that 
PETs should not be limited to anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability or 
unobservability, but should also be required to include transparency, 
automatic compliance assurance functions, and proactive techniques for risk 
analysis. Furthermore, TETs such as ‘sticky policies’ should provide clear 
information mechanisms and cross-disciplinary professions such as lawyers 
and designers are also required to work together to address the privacy issues 
in SN applications. 
SN service providers should take the necessary steps to decrease the user 
burden and to respect user privacy (Williams and Weber-Jahnke, 2010). They 
should provide an interactive user interface for controlling privacy settings;  
in this way, the user can edit, hide, or delete their personal information. If 
anyone sees their profile or personal information without their consent, the 
user will know, and be cautious when publishing information in future. In 
SNs, user-centric identity management can be one means of enabling users to 
protect their own privacy details. 
5 Enterprise architecture methodologies 
There are a number of enterprise architecture methodologies available to implement 
privacy-preserving architectures. However, as many as 90% of these have focussed on 
four methodologies: 
1 the Zachman framework for enterprise architectures 
2 the open group architectural framework (TOGAF) 
3 the federal enterprise architecture (FEA) 
4 the Gartner methodology (Sessions, 2007). 
5.1 The Zachman framework 
The Zachman framework is self-described as a ‘framework’; however, Sessions (2007) 
defined this framework as ‘ataxonomy’ since it organises architectural artefacts such as 
design documents, specifications, and models as taxonomy. The Zachman (2008) 
framework is typically depicted as six functional foci (data, function, network, people, 
time, and motivation) from the perspective of six major players of an organisation 
(planners, owners, designers, builders, subcontractors, and enterprises); these are 
represented in a 6 × 6 ‘matrix’, with the Communication Interrogatives as Columns and 
the Reification Transformations as Rows (Sessions, 2007). 
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5.2 The open group architectural framework 
TOGAF (The Open Group, 2013) is also known as a ‘framework’; however, Sessions 
(2007) defines the framework as ‘a process’ since the architecture development method 
(ADM) is used as a process for creating an enterprise architecture. TOGAF has a detailed 
method and set of supporting resources for developing an enterprise architecture. 
5.3 The federal enterprise architecture 
The FEA can be viewed as either an implemented enterprise architecture, or as a 
proscriptive methodology for creating an enterprise architecture (Sessions, 2007). FEA 
(United States Executive Office, 2012) provides principles and standards within and 
between agencies and external stakeholders across the Federal Government to develop 
business, information, and technology architectures. 
5.4 The Gartner methodology 
A well-known and leading organisation, Gartner Inc. (2014) has developed the  
Gartner methodology and many well-qualified specialist communities which encourage 
collaboration and best practice in technology research. Sessions (2007) describes the 
Gartner methodology as ‘an enterprise architectural practice’, as explored in Gartner 
Enterprise Architecture Process: Evolution 2005 (Bittler and Kreizmann, 2005). 
5.5 Comparison of enterprise architecture methodologies 
Sessions (2007) suggests a much more systematic approach to identify which architecture 
methodology is appropriate for an enterprise, and to distinctly differentiate between 
various enterprise architecture methodologies so as to establish criteria and ratings for 
each methodology. Sessions evaluated the methodologies based on 12 criteria and a 
ranking of 1–4 for each criterion. If a criterion does ‘a very poor job’ in that area, then the 
methodology scores ‘1’; it scores ‘2’ for ‘an inadequate job’, ‘3’ for ‘an acceptable job’, 
and ‘4’ for ‘a very good job’. Table 3 (adapted from Sessions, 2007) shows these criteria 
and ratings for enterprise architecture methodologies. Sessions recommends working 
through the criteria and determining the appropriate architecture methodology, as each 
has its strengths and weaknesses, and none is complete; for example, TOGAF has scored 
‘4 – a very good job’ for ‘process completeness’. 
Table 3 Criteria and ratings for enterprise architecture methodologies 
Ratings 
Criteria 
Zachman TOGAF FEA Gartner 
Taxonomy completeness 4 2 2 1 
Process completeness 1 4 2 3 
Reference-model guidance 1 3 4 1 
Practice guidance 1 2 2 4 
Maturity model 1 1 3 2 
Source: Adapted from Sessions (2007) 
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Table 3 Criteria and ratings for enterprise architecture methodologies (continued) 
Ratings 
Criteria 
Zachman TOGAF FEA Gartner 
Business focus 1 2 1 4 
Governance guidance 1 2 3 3 
Partitioning guidance 1 2 4 3 
Prescriptive catalogue 1 2 4 2 
Vendor neutrality 2 4 3 1 
Information availability 2 4 2 1 
Time to value 1 3 1 4 
Source: Adapted from Sessions (2007) 
6 Conclusions 
After analysing the literature of privacy issues in SNs architectures, we can observe that 
this area is still an open domain for research and analysts, researchers and SN users are 
expressing their concerns about these issues, and are engaging in attempts to mitigate 
these concerns. Analysing the literature, we have discovered points that remain open 
problems in research. To summarise, there is a need for a more fine-grained privacy 
protecting architecture that, in addition to being developed using appropriate privacy 
protecting principles and research methods, should be 
1 Distributed/federated web service approach: The contemporary distributed/web 
service federated approach for incorporating PbD to protect user privacy is 
recommended for SN services. This approach has established specific mechanisms 
for individuals, business, developers, government and academia (Federated Social 
Web Community Group, 2005). Individual users can decide where to store their data, 
which tools and features they use for their services, which provider they prefer, and 
can specify the technology which is used to store their data in their own individual 
storage. In this way, they can accomplish jurisdiction and rights over their own data 
(Federated Social Web Community Group, 2005). Although extensive research has 
been carried out on the web service federated/distributed approach, there are still 
challenges that are not adequately covered by this approach. Section 4.3 explains  
and compares some of these challenges. The key limitation of the web service 
federated/distributed approach is that providers may need to develop completely  
new services to achieve interoperability from the outset. 
2 Engaged preferred model: In the target architecture, the service provider should 
facilitate the SN services and functions based on preferred architecture model. In  
the access control and minimal information sharing model, service providers should 
store user information based on PbD principles. In the third party model, the service 
provider works as a third party storage device. The service provider contains 
information, but is unable to access user information directly. The service provider 
will store cloaked information provided in the ‘information anonymiser’, and will 
facilitate user information based on the user’s privacy positions. 
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3 Adapted PbD principles: To alleviate user burden and to ensure their full ownership 
of private information, the latest design paradigm, PbD, can be adapted into SNs. 
Embedding privacy directly into the ‘design and operation’ (Cavoukian and Prosch, 
2011) of a system can ensure the protection of privacy from the outset (Cavoukian 
and Prosch, 2011). In fact, incorporating privacy at the design stage can ensure SN 
users’ autonomy by default. This will reduce the burden on users and encourage an 
increase in social networking. This research suggests that seven PbD principles 
should be incorporated into a system at the design stage. Indeed, one of the specific 
objectives of this research is to encourage the engagement of privacy requirements in 
the system design stage for two reasons: 
a system development costs increase substantially in later stages of system 
development, so it is useful if privacy can be incorporated at this initial stage 
b privacy functionality can easily be engaged in the initial design stage, while  
it is extremely difficult to incorporate privacy in the later stages of system 
development. 
4 Adapted TOGAF: Since any architecture design is tremendously complex, this 
research suggests the TOGAF, based on a comparison of the top four enterprise 
architecture methodologies (Refer to Section 5 which includes a comparison of 
enterprise architecture methodologies, and lists a set of criteria for selecting 
appropriate architecture methodologies). All the studies reviewed so far, however, 
suffer from the fact that none is complete. Prior studies have noted the importance of 
selection of the TOGAF as the architecture methodology for SN services. This 
research recommends the TOGAF to develop the SN privacy framework for three 
reasons. Firstly, TOGAF (The Open Group, 2013) scores the three criteria of process 
completeness, vendor neutrality, and information availability as necessary to 
promote sharing and disclosure for SN users (Spiekermann and Cranor, 2009; Tan  
et al., 2012; Wallbridge, 2009). Secondly, the TOGAF enables frameworks to be 
tailor-made. Lastly, TOGAF offers ‘boundaryless information flow’ and open 
systems implementation (The Open Group, 2013). 
None of the prior studies found met all of these requirements, as their focus had not 
largely been on establishing the architecture to ensure that privacy is a feature of SNs. It 
needs to: be a fundamental element that is considered and embedded in the initial design 
stages of the SN development process; exist by default within a system; and be 
considered throughout the system’s life-cycle. Controlling access to information from the 
design stage will eliminate the need for retrospectively dealing with privacy breaches 
after they have already caused significant personal embarrassment and/or damage. Since 
privacy is a basic issue for SNs as users will terminate their usage if they feel unsafe in 
the SN environment. 
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